Reputation for Confidence

We model how a central bank communicates its noisy forecasts (forward guidance) while taking into account its own uncertainty (confidence) and the public’s perception of the bank’s uncertainty (reputation for confidence). This creates a mismatch between the public and central bank’s interpretation of the bank announcement which induces the bank to communicate with partial transparency and deliberate imprecision. Moreover, with higher confidence (lower reputation) announcements are more precise.

Congress has been dodging responsibility for tariffs for decades – now the Supreme Court will decide how far presidents can go alone

On Nov. 5, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear one of the most consequential trade cases in decades. The justices will decide whether a president can rely on a Cold War–era emergency law, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to impose sweeping import duties on a vast share of what the United States buys from abroad.

Banking on assumptions? How banks model deposit maturities

How do banks manage the behavioural maturity of non-maturing deposits (NMDs)? Using a rich and confidential dataset, we investigate how banks model deposit maturities based on internal assumptions. Although NMDs are contractually floating-rate liabilities with zero maturity, banks reallocate them across different maturity buckets using models that reflect past customer behaviour. Notably, only 20% of NMDs are treated as having zero maturity, while about 10% are assigned maturities beyond seven years. We assess whether these modelling assumptions align with banks’ deposit structures.

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