Financial institutions

Crypto-Asset Monitoring Expert Group (CAMEG) 2024 Conference - Book of abstracts

This paper provides an overview of recent analytical work conducted, under their own aegis, by experts from various European authorities and institutions in the field of crypto-asset monitoring. Currently, risks stemming from crypto-assets and the potential implications for central banking domains are limited and/or manageable, including as regards the existing regulatory and oversight frameworks. Nevertheless, the importance of monitoring developments in crypto-assets, raising awareness of the potential risks and fostering preparedness cannot be overstated.

Critical input disruptions – mapping out the road to EU resilience

We study how disruptions to the supply of foreign critical inputs (FCIs) might affect value added at different levels of aggregation. FCIs are inputs primarily sourced from extra-EU countries with highly concentrated supply, or consisting in advanced technology products, or which are key to the green transition. Using firm-level customs and balance sheet data for Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Slovenia, our framework allows us to assess how much – and how differently – geoeconomic fragmentation might affect European economies.

FEDS Paper: Discount window borrowing and the role of reserves and interest rates

Mark Carlson and Mary-Frances StyczynskiThe Federal Reserve’s discount window is a tool that can provide reserves to banks at a rate set by the Federal Reserve, the discount rate. During the past several years, there have been large fluctuations in the level of reserves in the banking system and in the level discount rate relative to other interest rates.

Firm ownership and the macroeconomics of incentive leakages

Questions about market power have become salient in macroeconomics. We consider the role of institutional structures in addressing these within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Standard models account for monopoly profits as a lump-sum transfer to the representative agent. We label this an "incentive leakage," and show this to be a general characteristic of firm-optimal arrangements. We show that shareholder-operated or worker-operated firms that eliminate leakage can generate within-firm incentives that effectively reduce monopoly distortion in equilibrium.

Firm ownership and the macroeconomics of incentive leakages

Questions about market power have become salient in macroeconomics. We consider the role of institutional structures in addressing these within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Standard models account for monopoly profits as a lump-sum transfer to the representative agent. We label this an "incentive leakage," and show this to be a general characteristic of firm-optimal arrangements. We show that shareholder-operated or worker-operated firms that eliminate leakage can generate within-firm incentives that effectively reduce monopoly distortion in equilibrium.

Fiscal and macroprudential policies during an energy crisis

We construct a New-Keynesian E-DSGE model with energy disaggregation and financial intermediaries to show how energy-related fiscal and macroprudential policies interact in affecting the euro area macroeconomy and carbon emissions. When a shock to the price of fossil resources propagates through the energy and banking sector, it leads to a surge in inflation while lowering output and carbon emissions, absent policy interventions.

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