When the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic struck, it was vital for many firms to retain access to funding from banks. In order to calculate their capital requirements, banks measure borrowers’ credit risk using either “their own”, internal ratings-based (IRB) models, or a standardised approach. This analysis examines whether model-based bank regulation constrained lending during the COVID-19 crisis. Results show that banks using their own models extended less credit than banks using a standardised approach.

Recent empirical findings (Bordalo et al., 2018, 2019; Greenwood et al., 2022) have vindicated the view thatsystemic risk in financial markets is also influenced by cognitive misperceptions about future economicdevelopments in addition to being influenced by financial frictions. Most of the literature on macroprudentialregulation, nonetheless, has omitted those misperceptions and instead has derived policy implicationsassuming rational expectations.

The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Education, has announced a new process for its handling of bankruptcy cases in which debtors seek an undue hardship student loan discharge. This new guidance has been a long time coming. In 2016, the DOE issued a request for information regarding evaluating undue hardship claims.

For months, cryptocurrency FTX (and its majority owner, Sam Bankman-Fried) have been the lender of last resort in crypto markets and pretty much the only distressed acquirer around. Now we learn that FTX has itself failed and is getting scooped up in a distressed acquisition by Binance. Does this remind anyone of Bank of America's purchase of Merrill Lynch and Countrywide in 2008? We'll see if the transaction closes, but at the very least it poses the question of whether Binance stands on any stronger ground than FTX?