This paper documents the extension of the system-wide stress testing framework of the ECB with the insurance sector for a more thorough assessment of risks to financial stability. The special nature of insurers is captured by the modelling of the liability side and its loss absorbing capacity of technical provisions as the main novel feature of the model.
Is the burden of distress in the banking sector shared equally among households, or is it distributed unevenly? Following the global financial crisis, the economic consequences of severe disruptions to the banking sector and the unequal impact of recessions have become a key concern of macroeconomic policy. This article examines how temporary banking sector losses affect households differently according to their income levels. The analysis reveals that low-income households bear most of the burden, while high-income households tend to be less adversely affected.
This article analyses how monetary policy shapes the aggregate and distributional effects of an energy price shock. Based on the observed heterogeneity in consumption exposures to energy and household wealth, we build a quantitative small open-economy Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model that matches salient features of the euro area data. The model incorporates energy as both a consumption good for households with non-homothetic preferences as well as a factor input into production with input complementarities.
What factors could drive transactional demand for central bank digital currency (CBDC)? We analyse payment survey data to arrive at a framework for understanding the role of adoption frictions and design strategies in shaping CBDC demand. The results of our analysis show that, while consumers may initially prefer to use more traditional payment methods, a design tailored to their specific needs could significantly increase CBDC uptake. Raising awareness and capitalising on network effects could also boost demand for CBDC.
Households differ considerably in terms of the inflation they experience at any point in time. The main reasons for this are that prices (and thus price changes) differ from place to place and that households do not all buy the same products. Households adjust their purchases over time, but not enough to offset these differences.
Large-scale asset purchases can impact the price of securities either directly, when securities are targeted by the central bank, or indirectly through portfolio rebalancing by private investors. We quantify both the direct impact and that of portfolio rebalancing, emphasising the role of investor heterogeneity. We use proprietary security-level data on asset holdings of different investors. We measure the direct impact at security level, finding that it is smaller for securities predominantly held by more price-elastic investors, i.e. funds and banks.
Households’ willingness to take on risks has clear implications for the transmission of financial shocks, both in the long run and over the business cycle. This article introduces a newly published research dataset from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) and summarises insights these data provide into household risk-taking. In particular, it examines how an increase in wealth affects a household’s decision on whether or not to invest in the stock market. The evidence suggests that all but the wealthiest households have a substantial aversion to investing in the stock market.
Some firms have the capacity to contribute significantly to economic productivity but cannot obtain the necessary capital for investment, which instead flows to less productive firms. While “misallocation of capital” and its detrimental impact on productivity is traditionally beyond the scope of central banks, monetary policy can influence it through firms’ investment decisions. Using a New Keynesian model and granular data on Spanish firms, our results show that expansionary monetary policy reduces capital misallocation.
The pandemic's disruption of global supply chains and the spike in natural gas prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were significant drivers of surging inflation. Traditional inflation models often ignore such supply-side shocks, even though they can have a significant and persistent impact on core inflation in the euro area (as measured by rates of change in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices excluding the energy and food components).
The pandemic's disruption of global supply chains and the spike in natural gas prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were significant drivers of surging inflation. Traditional inflation models often ignore such supply-side shocks, even though they can have a significant and persistent impact on core inflation in the euro area (as measured by rates of change in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices excluding the energy and food components).
