We uncover a strong U-shape in bond financing by US firms. Firms with total debt in the range of $10 million to $100 million tend to use much less bond financing relative to loan financing than do firms with more or less total debt.
We analyse how macroprudential policies (MaPs), largely applied to banks and to a lesser extent borrowers, affect non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI).
Fintech regulation: how to achieve a level playing field - Occasional Papers No 17, February 2021
Financial crises cause economic, social and political havoc. Macroprudential policies are gaining traction but are still severely under-researched compared to monetary policy and fiscal policy. We use the general framework of sequential predictions also called online machine learning to forecast crises out-of-sample.
It is important to understand the growth process under way in China. However, analyses of Chinese growth became increasingly more difficult after the real GDP doubling target was announced in 2012 and the official real GDP statistics lost their fluctuations. With a dataset covering 31 Chinese provinces from two decades, we have substantially more variation to work with.
We explore the economics and optimal design of "permissioned" distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus giving rise to a public good provision game.
Most central banks are exploring central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), and their work continues apace amid the Covid-19 pandemic. This BIS paper updates earlier surveys that asked central banks how their plans in this area are developing.
The Basel Committee is publishing the consultative document "Minimum haircut floors for securities financing transactions", January 2021.
We study optimal bank leverage and recapitalization in general equilibrium when the supply of specialized investment capital is imperfectly elastic.
Regulatory reforms following the financial crisis of 2007–08 created incentives for large global banks to lower their systemic importance. We establish that differences in profitability shape banks' response to these reforms.
